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ABSTRACT 
This Article is a legal-political examination of two of the most 
consequential elements in contemporary relations between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on 
Taiwan (ROC)—the controversial “1992 Consensus” and the 
remarkable cross-strait agreements that the ROC and the PRC have 
concluded, especially the 23 made between 2008 and 2015 when then 
President Ma Ying-jeou’s Nationalist Party (KMT) governed Taiwan.  
Political developments have inextricably interlinked these two 
elements, leading to the present crisis in cross-strait relations that 
developed when the ROC’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, led her 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to electoral victory over the 
KMT in 2016.  Tsai has refused to endorse the so-called “1992 
Consensus”, a strategic political formula that implied that Taiwan is 
part of China.  The PRC’s response has been to suspend all official 
contacts with the new ROC government, to cease or limit 
implementation of many of the cross-strait agreements and 
increasingly to mobilize a range of other pressures designed to 
coerce the new ROC government to adopt the “1992 Consensus”. 
By briefly referring to the domestic legal systems of the 
parties as well as international law, we seek to clarify the nature of 
the parties’ momentous dispute and to evaluate their respective 
positions.  We question whether there ever was a genuine “1992 
Consensus” and whether it should be regarded as a binding legal 
commitment.  The fiction of “consensus” was in fact a political 
strategy constructed after the fact to allow the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party governments to shelve their differing positions 
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concerning which government is the legitimate, exclusive 
representative of “China”, so that they could negotiate the more 
immediate challenges of concluding binding agreements on various 
practical subjects. 
The cross-strait agreements concluded by the parties 
imaginatively resorted to supposedly “unofficial” proxies to make 
cooperation on an equal footing possible between two governments 
that refuse to recognize each other.  Although for political reasons 
neither the PRC nor the ROC considers cross-strait agreements to 
fall within the province of international law, since the domestic laws 
and legal systems of the parties cannot provide impartial resolution 
of their dispute, we find it appropriate to assess their agreements by 
applying international legal principles, either directly or by analogy.  
In accordance with international legal principles and practice, we 
argue that all the cross-strait agreements that have been formally 
authorized by each side should be deemed to be legally binding.  We 
further recommend some modest steps that can be undertaken by the 
ROC toward diminishing the crisis and promoting a rule-based, 
sustainable order across the Taiwan Strait. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
When the former president of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan) Ma Ying-jeou was in office from 2008 to 
2016, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) 
initiated a groundbreaking series of measures fostering political 
reconciliation.  Taipei and Beijing, through their respective proxies—
Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)—
signed no fewer than 23 cross-strait agreements designed to facilitate 
cooperation in multiple areas, including transportation, tourism, 
judicial assistance, trade, investment and safety.2 
Yet Taiwanese dissatisfaction with the policy of Ma’s 
Kuomintang (KMT) government to minimize domestic popular and 
legislative participation in cross-strait agreements, combined with a 
                                                                                                               
 1 This Article was completed in December 2018. The speeches of Xi Jinping and Tsai 
Ing-wen for the New Year of 2019 concerning China-Taiwan relations vindicate our analysis 
about the divergent views of the “1992 Consensus.” These speeches, together with the 
response from the Kuomintang (KMT) rejecting Xi’s proposal of “One Country, Two 
Systems,” make it ever clearer that there was no genuine “consensus” about sovereignty 
issues disputed by the PRC and ROC governments. Notably, Xi Jinping’s remarks, linking 
“One Country, Two Systems” with the “1992 Consensus,” depart from China’s previous 
implicit practice not to publicly challenge the KMT’s position of “One China, Respective 
Interpretations.” See Xi Jinping, Wei Shixian Minzu Weida Fuxing Tuijin Zuguo Heping 
Tongyi er Gongtong Fendou--Zai “Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu” Fabiao Sishi Zhounian Jinian 
Hui Shang de Jianghua (為實現民族偉大復興推進祖國和平統一而共同奮鬥——在《告
台灣同胞書》發表 40 週年紀念會上的講話) [Jointly Strive to Fulfill Great Rejuvenation 
of the Chinese Nation and Promote Peaceful Unification of the Motherland--Speech at the 
40th Anniversary of “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”], Jan. 2, 2019, Xinhua,  
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/02/c_1123937757.htm  
[https://perma.cc/ZB6M-HJCK]; President Tsai Issues Statement on China’s President Xi’s 
“Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Jan. 2, 2019,  
https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621; Zhongguo Guomindang Shengming (中國國
民黨聲明) [Statement of the KMT], Kuomintang, Jan. 3, 2019,  
www.kmt.org.tw/2019/01/blog-post_3.html [https://perma.cc/D3Q7-AHNM].  
For our evaluation of the “1992 Consensus,” see infra Section I. 
 2 For a list of the cross-strait agreements, see the website of the ROC Mainland Affairs 
Council, Liang’an Xieyi (兩岸協議), 
MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) [hereinafter Cross-strait 
Agreements],  
https://www.mac.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=1494D59CE74DF095 [https://perma.cc/QD3J-ACNG] 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2018) (in Chinese language); Liang’an Xiangguan Xieyi (兩岸相關協
議), TAIWAN AFF. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL PRC [hereinafter Relevant Cross-strait 
Agreements], www.gwytb.gov.cn/lhjl/laxy/ [https://perma.cc/7TTN-DDBP] (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2018) (in Chinese language). 
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growing Taiwan identity and generally increasing anxiety over ties 
with Beijing, eventually resulted in Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement 
in March 2014.3  The trigger point for this protest was the KMT’s 
effort to push the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement through the 
legislature after the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), had filibustered it for nearly a year.  Angry with this 
KMT maneuver, student activists stormed into and occupied the 
legislative chamber for 24 days.  More than half a million Taiwanese 
protestors took to the streets to support the students’ demands to put 
more effective legislative checks on cross-strait cooperation, 
particularly the signing and implementation of cross-strait 
agreements. 
After the end of the Sunflower Movement, Beijing-Taipei 
relations gradually cooled.  Even an unprecedented meeting between 
the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi 
Jinping, and Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore in 2015,4 the first between 
the political leaders of China and Taiwan since the Chinese civil war 
ended on the Mainland over six decades earlier, was unable to revive 
the declining interaction.  In addition, the KMT suffered major 
electoral setbacks, losing to the DPP the local elections in November 
2014 and the island-wide legislative and presidential elections in 
2016.5 
The new DPP President, Tsai Ing-wen, has advocated a 
moderate stand on cross-strait relations.6  Unlike the first DPP leader 
                                                                                                               
 3 See generally Ian Rowen, Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days 
in a Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region, 74 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 1, 5 
(Feb. 2015); MICHAEL COLE, BLACK ISLAND: TWO YEARS OF ACTIVISM IN TAIWAN (2015); 
LAW AND POLITICS OF THE TAIWAN SUNFLOWER AND HONG KONG UMBRELLA MOVEMENTS 
(Brian Christopher Jones ed., 2017). 
 4 One-minute Handshake Marks Historic Meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-
jeou, THE STRAIT TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:51 PM),  
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meeting-
between-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou [https://perma.cc/33HW-B9BK]. 
 5 Min-Hua Huang, Taiwan’s Changing Political Landscape: The KMT’s Landslide 
Defeat in the Nine-in-One Elections, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2014),  
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-changing-political-landscape-the-kmts-
landslide-defeat-in-the-nine-in-one-elections/ [https://perma.cc/8BZN-PVKE]; 
Aube Rey Lescure, Taiwan’s 2016 Election in Review, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE (Jan. 26, 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/26/taiwan-s-2016-election-
in-review-pub-62586 [https://perma.cc/UKN3-4XHN]. 
 6 Douglas Paal, China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Dec. 29, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-the-u-s-and-the-coming-taiwan-
transition/ [https://perma.cc/3YPM-RU9M]; 
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elected to the presidency, Chen Shui-bian, who served from 2000 to 
2008 and who became increasingly controversial because of his 
apparent interest in declaring Taiwan’s de jure independence,7 Tsai 
claims to be maintaining the status quo and has called on Beijing to 
continue cooperation with Taipei.8 
Beijing, however, has rejected Tsai’s conciliatory policy.  It 
has used various non-cooperative and even coercive political, 
economic and military tactics, including minimizing the 
implementation of the existing cross-strait agreements, to pressure 
Tsai Ing-wen to recognize the so-called “1992 Consensus,” which 
Ma’s KMT government had embraced.9  Beijing considers Tsai’s 
explicit endorsement of the “1992 Consensus” to be the essential 
prerequisite to the PRC’s continuing implementation of cross-strait 
agreements.10 
Cross-strait relations are crucial to the stability of the Asian 
region as well as the U.S. relationships with China and Taiwan.  This 
Article focuses on the two most important, interlinked aspects of 
current cross-strait relations—the controversial “1992 Consensus” 
and the impressive cross-strait agreements.  A precise understanding 
and assessment of China’s and Taiwan’s positions on cross-strait 
relations requires analysis of the legal as well as political meaning of 
these two distinctive and crucial aspects. 
We proceed as follows: Part I investigates the basis and legal-
political significance of the “1992 Consensus.”  Part II discusses the 
innovative achievements and legal nature of the cross-strait 
agreements.  It introduces the recent dispute over the “1992 
Consensus” that has adversely affected the full implementation of the 
cross-strait agreements and explores the role of law in attempts to 
                                                                                                               
Fang-long Shih, Not Vague, But Moderate: the Political Philosophy in President Tsai Ing-
wen’s Inaugural Address, LSE TAIWAN RESEARCH PROGRAMME (May 26, 2016),  
www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/TaiwanProgramme/Statements/Not-Vague-
But-Moderate.aspx [https://perma.cc/NK7K-VTJD]; A Year in Office, Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-
wen Faces Surge in Anti-China Sentiment, THE STRAIT TIMES (May 19, 2017),  
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/a-year-in-office-taiwans-tsai-ing-wen-faces-
surge-in-anti-china-sentiment [https://perma.cc/8UZ3-K2XM]. 
 7 Chien-Min Chao, One Step Forward, One Step Backward: Chen Shuibian’s 
Mainland Policy, 12 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 125 (2003). 
 8 Tsai Calls for Cooperation to Ensure Peace, Stability in Asia-Pacific, TAIWAN 
TODAY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=127784 
[https://perma.cc/DEH5-P5TS]. 
 9 See discussion infra Sections II and III. 
 10 See discussion infra Section II. 
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resolve the dispute.  Part III discusses the broader political 
approaches of the two sides toward cooperation, including China’s 
non-compliance with cross-strait agreements and recent tactics to 
mount pressure on Tsai Ing-wen’s government.  Part IV’s Conclusion 
reflects our evaluation of not only the claims and actions of the parties 
regarding the “1992 Consensus” and the cross-strait agreements, but 
also the implications of their current stalemate.  Finally, we offer our 
comments about the role that law might play in enhancing prospects 
for a more peaceful and sustainable cross-strait future. 
I. THE “1992 CONSENSUS” 
A. The significance of the “Consensus” 
The “1992 Consensus” is a formula that supposedly 
encapsulated an agreement allegedly reached by the proxies of the 
ROC and PRC governments in 1992. 11   Beijing considers the 
“Consensus” crucial to its “One China Principle,” which it interprets 
to mean that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is part 
of China and that the PRC is the only legitimate government that 
represents the whole of China.12  It insists that Tsai Ing-wen explicitly 
endorse the “Consensus,” which implicitly excludes the possibility of 
Taiwan’s independence from China. 
This is why the “Consensus” is frequently stressed in 
Beijing’s political narrative.  At the 19th Congress of the CCP in 
October 2017, Xi Jinping stated: “(T)he 1992 Consensus embodies 
the One-China principle and defines the fundamental nature of cross-
strait relations.”13  Subsequently, the new head of the PRC State 
                                                                                                               
 11 “YIGE ZHONGGUO GEZI BIAOSHU” GONGSHI DE SHISHI (「一個中國，各自表述」
共識的史實) [“ONE CHINA, WITH RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS”—A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992] I-VIII (Chi Su & An-kuo Cheng eds., 2002) [hereinafter A 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992]; CHI SU, TAIWAN’S RELATIONS WITH 
MAINLAND CHINA: A TAIL WAGGING TWO DOGS 12-15 (2009). 
 12 Yige Zhongguo de Yuanze yu Taiwan Wenti Baipishu (一個中國的原則與台灣問
題 白 皮 書 ) [White Paper—the One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue], PRC 
GOVERNMENT, (Jan. 21, 2000),  
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307945/307945.htm.http://www.scio.g
ov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2000/Document/307945/307945.htm [https://perma.cc/C5VV-9MKH]. 
 13 Opening Ceremony of the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress (Oct. 
17, 2017),  
live.china.org.cn/2017/10/17/opening-ceremony-of-the-19th-cpc-national-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/GE8D-XCFQ]. 
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Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Liu Jieyi, in meeting with a KMT—
not DPP—delegation in March 2018 for the first time, reiterated that 
the “1992 Consensus” embodies the “One China Principle” and 
“opposes Taiwanese independence schemes in any form.” 14   In 
Beijing’s view, the “One China Principle” is non-negotiable15 and is 
the basis for all countries to develop diplomatic ties with China; “no 
country can be an exception to this rule.”16 
Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not 
recognized the existence of the “1992 Consensus.”17  Yet, she has 
tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing’s stance and that of 
her own party, the DPP.  In her inaugural speech, she carefully 
worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between SEF 
and ARATS in 1992 as “historical fact.”18  She stated that the meeting 
had “arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings” 
and was conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political 
attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences,”19 
a phrase often used by Beijing.  She added that, “it is based on such 
existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful 
development of the cross-strait relationship must be continuously 
promoted.”20  In other words, while Tsai did not accept the “1992 
Consensus,” she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a 
positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining cross-
strait peace. 
                                                                                                               
 14 Lai Hsiao-tung, Chung Li-hua & Sherry Hsiao, Chu Meets New Boss of China’s TAO, 
TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
 www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/03/27/2003690114 
[https://perma.cc/AZ38-JLBP]. 
 15 Willy Worley, One China Principle is Not Negotiable, Foreign Ministry Says in 
Response to Donald Trump Comments, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2017, 9:34 AM), 
 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/one-china-principle-non-negotiable-
donald-trump-comments-taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-a7527761.html  
[https://perma.cc/A8QL-XPYK]. 
 16 China Says No Country Can Be Exception to ‘One China’ Principle, REUTERS (Dec. 
15, 2016, 8:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-taiwan/china-says-
no-country-can-be-exception-to-one-china-principle-idUSKBN145053 
[https://perma.cc/D6BV-NJL3]. 
 17 Eleanor Albert, China-Taiwan Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations [https://perma.cc/3UQN-FJUG]. 
 18 President Tsai Ing-wen, Inaugural Presidential Address, FOCUS TAIWAN (May 20, 
2016, 11:49 AM), focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ZAD-
CTMD]. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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B. Fiction or reality? Consensus or dissensus? 
Why are there different views with regard to the “1992 
Consensus”?21  Was there ever a “consensus” reached in 1992?  After 
all, the term “1992 Consensus” was only coined in 2000 by Su Chi—
the KMT’s then Chairman of the ROC Executive Yuan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council (MAC).22  Su claimed this consensus could be found 
in the 1992 exchanges between SEF and ARATS.23  SEF and ARATS 
had been set up in November 1990 and December 1991, respectively, 
as “non-governmental,” “white-glove” organizations in order to 
enable them to negotiate and sign cross-strait agreements, because 
their respective governments were unwilling to have “official” 
contact with each other.24 
In March 1992, the representatives of SEF and ARATS met 
in Beijing to discuss technical matters including document 
authentication, tracing of registered mail, and compensation for lost 
mail.25  ARATS insisted that SEF make a statement on “One China”, 
while SEF held that the technical matters under negotiation should 
not involve political discussion.26 
The two organizations met again in Hong Kong from October 
28 to October 30, 1992.  During lengthy discussions, neither 
organization could agree to the various formulas proposed by the 
other side to describe the cross-strait political situation.27  Before the 
representatives parted, SEF suggested that each organization orally 
                                                                                                               
 21 See generally SU, supra note 11; Tong Zhenyuan (童振源) [Tung Cheng-yuan] & 
Chen Shuoting (陳碩廷) [Chen Shuo-ting], Jiuer Gongshi de Xingcheng, Shijian yu Wajie 
(九二共識的形成、實踐與瓦解) [The Formation, Implementation and Dissolution of the 
1992 Consensus], 2 ZHANWANG YU TANSUO (展望與探索) [Prospect and Exploration] 33; 
Alan D. Romberg, The “1992 Consensus”—Adapting to the Future?, 49 CHINA LEADERSHIP 
MONITOR (2016),  
https://www.hoover.org/research/1992-consensus-adapting-future [https://perma.cc/3TW2-
3E3S]. 
 22 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 34. 
 23 SU, supra note 11. 
 24 In exercising the public authority entrusted by the Taiwan government, SEF is 
supervised by the MAC, a full-fledged, official cabinet-level administrative agency in charge 
of the planning and implementation of policies toward Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Macau. ARATS is authorized to cooperate with SEF by the Taiwan Work Office of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council of the PRC Government. 
 25 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 36. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 37. 
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state its own position regarding “One China”, but no conclusion was 
reached.28 
SEF sought to end the stalemate a few days later by issuing a 
press release and sending ARATS a letter on November 3, 1992, 
stating that “it is acceptable if the two sides orally state their own 
positions separately.” 29   SEF added that its own position is in 
accordance with the National Unification Guidelines and the 
resolution made on August 1, 1992 by the ROC’s National 
Unification Council.  This referred to a resolution that defined the 
Taiwanese government’s position on “One China.”30  The resolution 
stated that “both sides of the Strait insist on the principle of ‘One 
China,’ but the two sides have different views regarding its meaning.”  
It went on to explain the difference, stating that, from the viewpoint 
of the Communist authorities, “One China” refers to the PRC, but 
from the viewpoint of the ROC, “One China” refers to the ROC.31 
ARATS reportedly responded the same day with a telephone 
call, informing SEF that it “fully respected and accepted” SEF’s 
suggestion.”32  On November 16 the same year, ARATS sent a formal 
letter to SEF, again stating that ARATS “fully respects and accepts 
your Foundation’s suggestion.”33  It added that the oral statement that 
ARATS would make would note that, “both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
insist on the principle of one China, seeking the unification of the 
nation; but the functional negotiations of cross-strait matters do not 
involve the political meaning of one China.”34 
These fragmentary exchanges were later relied upon by those 
who claimed the existence of the “1992 Consensus.”35  When the 
KMT’s Su Chi coined the term, what he reportedly had in mind was 
                                                                                                               
 28 Id. 
 29 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 25-28; SU, 
supra note 11, at 1. 
 30 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 32; SU, supra 
note 11, at 13; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 37. 
 31 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 32. 
 32 SU, supra note 11, at 13-14; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 37-38. 
 33 A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 11, at 42-46; SU, 
supra note 11, at 14; Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 38. 
 34 Id. 
 35 SU, supra note 11, at 14; see also President Ma Ying-jeou, Remarks in Meeting with 
Mainland Chinese Leader Xi Jinping, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN 
ROC (TAIWAN) (Nov. 9, 2015),  
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60
C4AFBAF90&s=4F225A4BA95218E4) [https://perma.cc/6EWM-RH22]. 
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the formula of “One China, Respective Interpretations” (Yige 
Zhongguo Gezi Biaoshu 一個中國，各自表述, OCRI).36  In Su’s 
formulation, the “Consensus” at best can be understood as a formula 
to implicitly agree that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is 
part of that “China” but to disagree about which government is the 
legitimate, exclusive representative of that “China.” 37   In the 
interpretation of the KMT’s ROC Government, “one China” means 
the ROC, not the PRC. 
By contrast, in Beijing’s current narrative, the “1992 
Consensus” embodies its own “One China Principle,” which 
emphasizes the PRC as the only legitimate government that 
represents the whole of China, including Taiwan, 38  without 
acknowledging that the Taiwan side may have a different 
interpretation. In the PRC’s view, the phrase “respective 
interpretations” in the OCRI formula should not exist.  Indeed, from 
1995 to 1998, when cross-strait relations were at a low point, the PRC 
denied there was ever a consensus about OCRI.39 
Despite this difference, SEF and ARATS, after the November 
1992 exchanges, proceeded to negotiate cooperation.  In April 1993, 
the SEF chairman, Koo Chen-fu, and the ARATS chairman, Wang 
Daohan, held groundbreaking talks in Singapore and formally signed 
four agreements—the Agreement on Document Authentication, the 
Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail, 
the Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and 
Communication Channels between the SEF and ARATS, and the 
Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.40  These instruments paved the 
way for later regular negotiations and cooperation between SEF and 
ARATS. 
                                                                                                               
 36 SU, supra note 11, at 14. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Mainland Stresses One-China Principle in Relations with Taiwan, XINHUA NEWS 
(Tian Shaohui ed. July 17, 2016),  
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/17/c_135519622.htm  
[https://perma.cc/45XC-HEVT]. 
 39 Tung & Chen, supra note 21, at 43. 
 40 Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE 
YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) (July 29, 1994),  
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE
1BCE87E0E&s=D6A36C53F3FB9CC1 [https://perma.cc/774S-A38L]. 
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C. Legal-political evaluation of the 1992 SEF-ARATS 
exchanges 
How should we evaluate the November 1992 SEF-ARATS 
exchanges from a legal perspective?  First of all, neither Beijing nor 
Taipei has officially characterized its relations with the other side in 
terms of international law.  Indeed, they have both denied its direct 
applicability.  Yet, as we will note again in Part II, their respective 
domestic laws have little to offer regarding settlement of disputes 
relating to cross-strait agreements.  Taipei, taking advantage of the 
fact that the world community has not yet vindicated Beijing’s claim 
that Taiwan is part of China,41 may ultimately alter its position and 
formally invoke international law in this context.  Even if it does not, 
this should not prevent foreign governments and international 
organizations, as well as scholars and other observers, from assessing 
the legal nature of cross-strait relations and related controversies with 
the helpful lens of international law.  Indeed, some experts on both 
sides of the Strait have already done so. 
Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges 
would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of 
“One China” and other sovereignty questions.  While SEF and 
ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own 
governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation, 
the intention42 of each organization was to sign legal instruments 
                                                                                                               
 41 FRANK CHIANG, THE ONE-CHINA POLICY: STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN’S 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS 282 (2017) (“The United Nations has no official policy that 
maintains that China has the title to the island of Taiwan or China has sovereignty over the 
inhabitants of Taiwan.”); LUNG-CHU CHEN, THE U.S.-TAIWAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 79 (2016) (“General Assembly Resolution 2758, which 
recognized the PRC as the only legal government of China, did not go so far as to recognize 
that Taiwan was an integral part of China.”). Additionally, observers have long noted that 
the One-China policy of the United States is not the same as the PRC’s One-China principle. 
See Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer, 10 EAST ASIA POL’Y PAPER 1, 3 (Mar. 
2017),  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E2Y6-USFF] (“The One-China policy contains more elements, such as the 
U.S. interest in a peaceful process of cross-Strait dispute resolution, and its differing 
interpretation of Taiwan’s legal status as compared to Beijing’s interpretation.”); Pasha L. 
Hsieh, The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed 
Momentum, 84 J. OF INT’L PEACE & ORG. 59, 71 (2009) (“The key difference between the 
stances of the PRC and the US is that the latter has never recognized the PRC’s sovereignty 
over Taiwan.”). 
 42 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 41 (Oliver Dörr 
& Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2018) (noting that whether there is intention can be decided 
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recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation, 
such as document authentication and registered mail.  The parties 
never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty 
matters involving the notion of “One China” precisely because they 
could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved.  Instead, 
they bypassed the “One China” issues and went on to conclude formal 
written agreements on technical matters. 
In other words, the element of intent to create legal 
obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist.43  This is evident 
from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a 
written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and 
suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately.  
This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by 
the two organizations on various economic and technical matters.44  
None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the “One China” 
issue, and all were concluded without regard to it. 
Without the necessary element of consensus ad idem to effect 
any binding obligation, these exchanges in 1992 between SEF and 
ARATS would not constitute a “treaty” under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)45 nor any other type of legally binding 
obligation under customary international law.  There was never a 
meeting of the minds regarding the “One China” notion. 
Su Chi claimed that these exchanges were an “exchange of 
notes,” 46  which, he maintained, represents the views expressed 
regarding certain issues and is “politically binding to a certain 
degree.”47  Yet it is unclear what “politically binding to a certain 
degree” means in this context, and it certainly is not equivalent to 
“legally binding”.48  After all, political policies are, at most, policies 
that can be changed, while a treaty or other international agreement 
                                                                                                               
with view to the drafting history, the language of the agreement and the circumstances of its 
conclusion as well as the subsequent practice). 
 43 See id. (noting that “if the intent of the parties to be legally bound under international 
law cannot be determined on the basis of objective criteria, it has to be assumed that no legal 
relations have been established.”). 
 44 See sources cited supra note 2. 
 45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679. 
 46 SU, supra note 11, at 14. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Certainly, an “exchange of notes” is capable of generating binding legal obligations 
on states, but, as discussed above, evidence does not support the existence of the intent as 
such and there was no “consensus” in terms of both acceding to a certain position. 
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creates obligations that should be fulfilled under international law in 
the absence of valid legal justification or resort to termination or 
amendment procedures. 
The “1992 Consensus” must be understood as a formula 
strategically constructed after the fact to allow the KMT and the CCP 
governments to shelve their differing positions concerning which 
government is the legitimate, exclusive representative of “China”, so 
that they could proceed to cooperation.  The formula is thus not a 
consensus in any meaningful sense. 
The KMT and the CCP disagreed on the crucial political 
questions before them, but neither wished to publicly confront the 
other, thus enabling them to move on to negotiation of more 
immediate issues.  This delicate strategy later allowed SEF and 
ARATS to again steer away from political discussion and sign 23 
cross-strait agreements from 2008 to 2015.  Their resort to the fiction 
of the “1992 Consensus” is a remarkable demonstration of what 
Holmes Welch, a shrewd observer of the Chinese scene, fifty years 
ago termed “the Chinese art of make believe.”49  This fiction was 
designed to conceal what was in reality a dissensus! 
By contrast, the new DPP government does not accept the 
existence of a “1992 Consensus.”50  Nor does it approve either the 
KMT’s formula of OCRI, or Beijing’s “One China Principle.”51  Yet 
Beijing insists that Taiwan’s DPP government must recognize the 
“1992 Consensus” before any further cooperation can be discussed 
and even before some of the important cross-strait agreements can 
continue to be implemented.52 
                                                                                                               
 49 Holmes Welch, The Chinese Art of Make-Believe, ENCOUNTER 8 (May 1968). 
 50 E.g., William Kazer, Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Skirts ‘One China’ Consensus in 
Inaugural Address, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-
new-president-skirts-one-china-consensus-in-inaugural-address-1463723943 
[https://perma.cc/9DG7-K9WH];  
Beijing ‘Unshakeable’ on ‘One China’ Principle as Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Refuses to Bow 
to Pressure, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 6, 2016),  
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2025722/beijing-unshakeable-
one-china-principle-taiwan [https://perma.cc/VPH6-F5CL]; Wangshu Luo, One-China 
Principle Reiterated After Speech, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 27, 2017),  
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/27/content_33759481.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z3MR-8AEC]. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Guotaiban: Ru Fouding Jiu Er Gongshi Zhengzhi Jichu Shibi Daozhi Liang’an 
Guanxi Xianzhuang Gaibian (國台辦：如否定「九二共識」政治基礎勢必導致兩岸關
係現狀改變) [Taiwan Affairs Office: The Denial of the Political Foundation of the “1992 
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DPP acquiescence to this demand would be tantamount to its 
implicit concession, as a matter of policy, that Taiwan is part of 
“China”.  This would presumably foreclose, at least for the 
foreseeable future, the option of the island’s formal independence, 
even though many countries have yet to accede to Beijing’s position 
on the territorial status of Taiwan.53 
II. CROSS-STRAIT AGREEMENTS 
A. An impressive accomplishment gone sour? 
After SEF and ARATS chairmen Koo Chen-fu and Wang 
Daohan signed the first four SEF-ARATS agreements on April 29, 
1993,54 the two organizations continued routine talks until cross-strait 
relations deteriorated in 1995, when the United States Government 
granted Taiwan’s then president, Lee Teng-hui, permission to enter 
the U.S. to visit his alma mater, Cornell University.  There he gave a 
famous speech about Taiwan’s democratization.55  Beijing responded 
with personal attacks on Lee and a threatening series of missile tests 
in the waters surrounding Taiwan in 1995-96.56  In October 1998, 
when cross-strait agitation had relented, Koo Chen-fu visited Wang 
Daohan in Shanghai, with the hope of resuming the interrupted SEF-
ARATS talks. 57   But cross-strait tension returned in 1999 when 
President Lee Teng-hui characterized Taiwan-China relations as a 
“special state-to-state relationship,” which implied that Taiwan 
enjoyed independent international status. 58   This eliminated the 
                                                                                                               
Consensus” Must Lead to the Change of the Status Quo in Cross-strait Relations], XINHUA 
WANG (新華網) [Xinhua Net] (Apr. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Guotaiban],  
www.xinhuanet.com/2016-04/27/c_1118752398.htm [https://perma.cc/59Z7-2ESL]. 
 53 See supra note 41. 
 54 Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, supra note 40. 
 55 President Lee Tenghui Cornell Commencement Address, EAST ASIAN PEACE & SEC. 
INITIATIVE (1995),  
https://www.eapasi.com/uploads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_--
_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/R4PE-6BU4]. 
 56 Bruce Jacobs & I-hao Ben Liu, Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of “Taiwan”, 190 CHINA 
Q. 375, 385 (2007). 
 57 Remarks Made by SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu Upon Arrival at Shanghai Hongqiao 
Airport, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ROC (TAIWAN) (Oct. 14, 1998), 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=45276FBF58204DDE&sms=232A20F
F37090599&s=39FB754FF34BE816[ https://perma.cc/W6ZS-DHDG]. 
 58 Jacobs & Liu, supra note 56, at 388-89. 
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possibility of cooperative cross-strait talks in the absence of more 
positive developments. 
From 2000 to 2008, the first DPP president of Taiwan, Chen 
Shui-bian, refused to recognize any familiar formulation relating to 
“One China,” including the KMT’s OCRI and Beijing’s One China 
Principle.  Although Chen would not concede that there was ever a 
“1992 Consensus,” he did acknowledge a “1992 Spirit,” which he 
termed a spirit of “dialogue, exchanges and shelving disputes.”59  Yet 
the gap between Chen’s position and Beijing’s remained, and no 
cross-strait negotiation was initiated during this period.60 
When Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he embraced the 
KMT version of the “1992 Consensus”—i.e., the KMT’s OCRI 
formula.61  Beijing, while still holding onto its One China Principle, 
was willing to cooperate with Ma.  As Beijing hoped that Taiwan’s 
increasing economic integration would lead to political integration,62 
Ma adopted the policy of “addressing economic matters before 
political ones.”63  The shared priority on economics placed by the two 
sides led to a renewed series of SEF-ARATS negotiations, which 
produced many significant agreements.  Their efforts culminated in 
an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 
2010 and a Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in June 
2013.64  China’s Xi Jinping, after taking over Mainland leadership 
from Hu Jintao in late 2012, wished to begin political discussions 
                                                                                                               
 59 Luweihui: You Jiu Er Jingsheng Wu Jiu Er Gongshi (陸委會：有九二精神 無九二
共識 ) [Mainland Affairs Council: There is “1992 Spirit” and No “1992 Consensus”], 
ZHIYOU SHIBAO (自由時報) [Liberty Times] (Nov. 1, 2001),  
old.ltn.com.tw/2001/new/nov/1/today-t2.htm [https://perma.cc/K48Q-DBPA]. 
 60 Chen’s Speech a Grave Provocation to Peace, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 13, 2004), 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/13/content_381992.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5BFG-734S]; Jane Rickards, SEF Seeks Talks for Second Time with China 
Over Official’s Visit, CHINA POST (Nov. 18, 2005),  
https://chinapost.nownews.com/20051118-148799 [https://perma.cc/DU49-6MAW]. 
 61 President Ma’s Inaugural Address, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(TAIWAN) (May 20, 2008),  
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/45 [https://perma.cc/8GNV-E3CR]. 
 62 Dennis V. Hickey, Beijing’s Evolving Policy toward Taipei: Engagement or 
Entrapment, 45 ISSUES & STUD. 31, 38-39 (2009). 
 63 President Ma’s Inaugural Address, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(TAIWAN) (May 20, 2012),  
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3887 [https://perma.cc/H5G4-CJ4D]. 
 64 See sources cited supra note 2. 
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with Taiwan soon,65 but the Ma government made it clear that in its 
view the time was not yet ripe for political talks.66 
Ma Ying-jeou was well aware of the potential opposition in 
Taiwan to closer ties with Beijing, even within his own political party, 
the KMT.  Thus, although KMT legislators constituted a majority in 
the Legislative Yuan throughout Ma’s presidency, he sought to 
minimize the opportunity for legislative review of the new cross-strait 
agreements, despite the DPP’s objection.  The Ma administration 
insisted that, for most cross-strait agreements, no substantive 
legislative review was required by Taiwan’s 1992 Law Governing 
Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
Area (the Law Governing Cross-strait Relations).67  Under that law, 
a cross-strait agreement must be sent to Taiwan’s legislature for a 
substantive review in circumstances where “the content of the 
agreement requires any amendment to laws or creation of any new 
legislation.” 68   In cases where no legislative amendment or new 
legislation is required, the agreement need only be filed with the 
Legislative Yuan for the record.69  Regardless of the controversies 
created by its position, the Ma government successfully filed 19 
agreements (out of 23 agreements concluded during Ma’s presidency) 
with the Legislative Yuan merely “for the record,” instead of going 
through a substantive legislative review that might have held up 
approval.70 
                                                                                                               
 65 Ben Blanchard, China’s Xi Says Political Solution for Taiwan Can’t Wait Forever, 
REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2013, 5:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-asia-apec-
china-taiwan-idUSBRE99503Q20131006 [https://perma.cc/SV5Q-ZB22]. 
 66 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Ma Says Time not Right for Cross-strait Peace Pact, TAIPEI TIMES 
(Nov. 10, 2012), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/11/10/2003547334 
[https://perma.cc/9AEE-T3PQ]. 
 67 Taiwan Diqü yu Dalu Diqü Renmen Guanxi Tiaoli (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關
係條例) [The Law Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the 
Mainland Area] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, July 31, 1992, effective Sept. 18, 
1992, last amended June 17, 2015). 
 68 Id. art. 5, ¶ 2. 
 69 Id. 
 70 The four exceptions were the ECFA, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection and Cooperation, the CSSTA and the Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and Enhancement of Tax Cooperation. The first two of these 
agreements passed substantive review in August 2010. The third and the fourth, however, 
were not able to pass substantive review before the end of Ma’s administration due to the 
political sentiment adverse to cross-strait cooperation after the Sunflower Movement, and 
therefore have never been approved and have not yet gone into effect. 
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Although generally underappreciated, it was an impressive 
achievement for Taipei and Beijing to conclude and implement such 
a large number of important cross-strait agreements on an equal 
footing by establishing the supposedly “unofficial” agencies SEF and 
ARATS.  This was done despite the fact that Beijing has always 
maintained that Taiwan is merely a province of the PRC, and that the 
Mainland’s Central Government would never deal with Taiwan on an 
equal footing. 
To avoid the implications of the failure to agree on the 
sensitive political issues involving sovereignty, the cross-strait 
agreements cleverly steered away from wording such as “China”, 
“Taiwan”, “government” and other phrases that may be associated 
with international relations and international law such as 
“extradition”.71  Instead, innocuous terms such as “parties” and “both 
sides of the Strait” (haixia liang’an 海峽兩岸) were used.  When 
alluding to officials in charge of implementation, they used 
“personnel from the relevant responsible authorities”.  The 
imaginative accomplishment is a further demonstration of their 
willingness to resort to “the Chinese art of make-believe”72 in order 
to meet the practical needs of cooperation.  And, of course, even 
while both sides continue to declare that their relationship is not 
“international,” to the rest of the world the agreements that this fiction 
has enabled look suspiciously similar to agreements between 
sovereign governments. 
B. Resolving relevant disputes under cross-strait agreements 
How should cross-strait agreements be regarded by the 
international legal order? Is international law relevant—either 
directly or by analogy—to the resolution of disputes that arise under 
cross-strait agreements?  We do not purport to discuss the perennial 
and hugely important international questions concerning Taiwan’s 
diplomatic and territorial status that the parties decided to avoid in 
                                                                                                               
 71 For example, in the Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial 
Mutual Assistance, the procedure of returning criminals requested by the other side is 
formally termed “repatriation” (qiansong 遣送), rather than “extradition” (yindu 引渡), 
despite the fact that it is in many ways similar to the practice of extradition in conventional 
bilateral relations. 
 72 Welch, supra note 49. 
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achieving their supposed “Consensus.”73  We are only concerned 
with the immediate, practical question of whether international law 
might offer Taipei relief from Beijing’s refusal to carry out its 
obligations under some of the agreements. 
Neither the cross-strait agreements themselves nor the 
domestic laws and institutions of the parties hold significant promise 
for a party that feels itself the victim of the other party’s violations.  
The minimal dispute resolution provisions in the cross-strait 
agreements—which generally amount to little more than admonitions 
that both parties should negotiate to resolve as soon as possible any 
disputes arising from the application of the agreement—are of no 
value if one of the parties simply boycotts negotiations, which in itself 
is another violation of the agreement. 
Although Taiwan law carefully authorizes SEF to make 
agreements with ARATS, it fails to provide effective remedies for 
violations of the agreements.  In Taiwan’s legal system, “cross-strait 
agreements” appears to be a sui generis legal category, distinct from 
both conventional domestic agreements and international agreements.  
Nor does the PRC legal system offer opportunities for Taiwan to 
obtain relief from even blatant violations of cross-strait agreements. 
The problem can be illustrated by reference to the example of 
the 2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and 
Judicial Mutual Assistance (Judicial Assistance Agreement or 
JAA),74 which operated relatively smoothly during the years of the 
Ma administration.  Once it became clear that the Tsai administration 
would not endorse the “1992 Consensus”, Beijing ceased significant 
cooperation under the agreement, and has failed to respond to efforts 
to improve the situation, including resort to the agreement’s modest 
dispute resolution provision.75 
Can international law and institutions be helpful to the party 
that deems itself to have been wronged under this agreement?  The 
JAA appears to have been properly concluded in accordance with 
                                                                                                               
 73 Many able scholars have closely examined the issue relating to the international 
status of the ROC and Taiwan. E.g., Hungdah Chiu, The International Legal Status of the 
Republic of China, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS / REPRINT SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STU. 1 
(1992); CHIANG, supra note 41. 
 74 See discussions infra Section III C. 
 75 Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance, 
Taiwan-China art. 22, May 22, 2009, MAINLAND AFF. COUNCIL OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN 
ROC (TAIWAN) [hereinafter JAA] (stating that “any disputes arising from the application of 
this Agreement shall be resolved by prompt negotiation between the Parties.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
20 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
international contractual principles.  Like many other cross-strait 
agreements, it provides that both sides should comply with the 
agreement and that any changes to the agreement, including its 
termination provisions, require the negotiation and consent of both 
parties.76  Evidently, there existed an intention from both parties to 
create binding obligations.  Even though the territorial status of 
Taiwan remains an unsettled question and the ROC government only 
maintains diplomatic relations with a minority of states, the ROC 
conducts de facto relations, including the conclusion of international 
agreements, with virtually all important states and is fully capable of 
entering into such agreements either directly or via an authorized 
entity such as SEF.  There is no doubt that SEF was properly 
authorized to enter into the JAA, as was ARATS, and there was 
evidently a meeting of the minds resulting in what should be regarded 
by any domestic or international legal system as a binding set of 
commitments. 
In the international legal order, such cross-strait agreements 
should be treated as legally binding—regardless of what they are 
called in each party’s domestic law.  The principle pacta sunt 
servanda should be applied.  The parties should not be allowed to 
unilaterally revise or withdraw from the agreements in the absence of 
valid justification or compliance with termination or amendment 
procedures.77 
International legal principles can be helpful in assessing the 
merit of controversies arising under the cross-strait agreements.  But 
where can a wronged party find a forum to plead its case if the other 
party refuses to apply the relevant principles and take part in a dispute 
resolution negotiation?  SEF itself surely has no access to the 
International Court of Justice, and the ROC, having lost its 
representation in the United Nations, is very unlikely to do better.  In 
any event the PRC, which shuns third party adjudication, arbitration 
                                                                                                               
 76 Id. art. 21. 
 77 While the PRC acceded to the VCLT in 1997, the ROC failed to ratify the 
Convention, which it signed in 1970, before being ousted from the UN in 1971. Since the 
ROC is not a party, the VCLT cannot apply to cross-strait agreements, but this should not 
affect their legal force under international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 3(a)., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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or even mediation in disputes that it perceives involve sovereignty,78 
would never consent to such dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, we believe that SEF should propose that 
ARATS accept ad hoc arbitration by an independent tribunal, if only 
to embarrass Beijing and enhance respect for Taipei in the court of 
world opinion.  In all likelihood world opinion will be its only 
available forum, as so often occurs in international disputes. 
The ROC should therefore make public not only its arbitration 
proposal, but also its arguments on the merits of the JAA dispute, in 
conventional international law language that should be introduced as 
either directly applicable to the dispute or applicable by analogy.  
This might at least stimulate Beijing, which is still subject to 
widespread criticism over its refusal to recognize the major 
arbitration award rendered against it concerning the South China Sea, 
in a proceeding brought by the Philippines under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, to try to mount a legal defense of 
its cessation of implementation under the agreement.  Presumably, 
Beijing might claim that President Tsai’s refusal to adopt the “1992 
Consensus” had undermined the tacit, never consensually articulated, 
basis of the agreement 79  and thereby released ARATS from any 
obligations under it, an argument more likely to appeal to political 
scientists than lawyers. 
If the two parties ever resume negotiations regarding the 
agreement, Taipei should, of course, raise its concerns about 
Beijing’s non-compliance and seek to include in any future 
agreement, and in amendments to the existing one, robust 
mechanisms to resolve relevant disputes, including the possibility of 
submitting the dispute to an impartial tribunal. 
III. BROADER POLITICAL APPROACHES AND PROSPECTS 
A. Tsai Ing-wen’s approach 
In Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural address, she stated that cross-
strait relations will be promoted based on four “political foundations”: 
(1) the “historical fact” of the key 1992 SEF-ARATS meeting and the 
                                                                                                               
 78 Jerome A. Cohen, Law and Power in China’s International Relations, DI LIU JIE MA 
HANBAO JIANGZUO LUNWEN HUIBIAN (第六屆馬漢寶講座論文彙編) [SIXTH HERBERT 
HAN-PAO MA DISTINGUISHED LECTURESHIP] 275, 283-295 (2017). 
 79 Guotaiban, supra note 52. 
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shared understanding of seeking common ground while shelving 
differences, (2) the ROC’s current Constitutional regime, (3) the 
achievements resulting from the negotiations and interaction of the 
two sides of the Strait over more than two decades, and (4) Taiwan’s 
democratic principles and popular will. 80   Her China policy is 
considered moderate by the United States and other Western 
governments.81 
Tsai’s inaugural address suggested that she was prepared to 
cooperate under the existing cross-strait agreements.  Indeed, while 
the DPP generally voiced objection to cross-strait agreements and the 
lack of adequate legislative supervision when the KMT was in office 
from 2008-2016,82 Tsai’s administration has consistently stated that 
Taiwan is willing to continue to cooperate with Mainland China 
regarding the implementation of the agreements and properly address 
any problems.83 
On the other hand, Tsai’s administration also emphasizes that 
cross-strait agreements must be scrutinized more vigorously by 
Taiwan’s democratic institutions.  Since the Sunflower Movement, 
the DPP has maintained that new legislation—namely a Cross-Strait 
Agreement Supervisory Act—is needed to effectively monitor the 
negotiation, signing and implementation of Taiwan’s agreements 
with China. 84   Currently, there are six different versions of this 
proposed legislation on the agenda of Taiwan’s legislature.85  Each 
version has a different level of scrutiny for the agreements, and, more 
controversially, is different in terms of how to define the nature of 
cross-strait relations.  One bill, for example, explicitly describes 
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China-Taiwan relations as interstate relations, instead of “cross-strait 
relations,” as they are normally termed in Taiwan’s legislation.86 
Obviously, trying to pass a law that can spark many 
controversies, including those relating to Taiwan’s sovereignty, is not 
what Tsai Ing-wen needs at this point, when her popularity has 
declined due to other domestic reform issues.87  The DPP caucus also 
appears to be dragging its feet on the proposed “supervisory” 
legislation. 88   Yet, without this legislation, Tsai’s government is 
unlikely to sign any new agreement with Beijing even if the two sides 
resume talks, and there is no indication that any talks will be resumed 
soon. 
B. Xi Jinping’s approach 
After Tsai made her conciliatory tone clear in her inaugural 
address, China could have seized this opportunity to initiate 
communication with the DPP government.  Instead, the PRC’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office, noting that Tsai did not clearly recognize the 
so-called “1992 Consensus,” described Tsai’s inaugural speech as an 
“incomplete test answer.”89  Beijing has since cut any official contact 
with the DPP administration.90  There are no longer SEF-ARATS 
meetings to negotiate new agreements or to communicate about the 
implementation of the existing agreements.  Beijing has selectively 
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continued to implement the existing cross-strait agreements as it 
strives to mount increasing pressures on Tsai’s government. 
From Beijing’s perspective, only the “1992 Consensus” can 
serve as a “common political foundation” for any future ARATS-SEF 
talks or more official dialogues, not to mention further cross-strait 
agreements.91  Without the “Consensus”, adverse “changes in cross-
strait relations would be inevitable.” 92   This narrative implies 
Beijing’s self-justification for unilaterally limiting or ceasing the 
implementation of the cross-strait agreements. 
In our view, this non-cooperative approach is rigid, 
unnecessary and self-restrictive.  By contrast, Beijing was willing to 
cooperate with the KMT government even though Beijing’s 
interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” was different from that of the 
KMT’s.  It was flexible enough to not publicly challenge the KMT’s 
position on the “1992 Consensus,” enabling the two sides to proceed 
to discuss other matters.  Yet Beijing would not adopt a similarly 
adaptable approach with the DPP government, which it does not trust. 
Beijing is suspicious that Tsai Ing-wen, while not 
declaring de jure Taiwan independence, will promote “soft 
independence,” “cultural independence” and other de-sinicization 
policies that foster an already strong Taiwan national identity 
independent of China.93  Xi Jinping has proclaimed the “Chinese 
Dream of national rejuvenation” as a priority and made the return of 
Taiwan to Mainland China’s rule an indispensable part of the rise of 
the Chinese nation.94  This represents a dramatic shift in the political 
atmosphere from the post-2008 Ma Ying-jeou “honeymoon” period 
for China-Taiwan relations.  The current time is often described as an 
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era of “cold peace.”95  Some commentators predict an even more 
problematic period of “hot confrontation.”96 
Although China now rejects implementation of certain cross-
strait agreements, it has not gone so far as to formally renounce any 
of them.  It has mostly minimized, if not ceased, the implementation 
of some of them.  Sometimes it deliberately ignores their existence 
when doing so would be politically advantageous for pressing the 
Tsai government.  Yet, where the practical consequences of 
suspending implementation would obviously be harmful to the major 
interests of both sides of the Strait, as in the case of an interruption or 
reduction of air and sea transportation, Beijing has allowed the 
relevant agreements to continue largely unaffected. 
In other words, Beijing is not ready to entirely discard the 
agreements.  It is probably also concerned that, if it repudiates any 
cross-strait agreements, the “1992 Consensus”—which in Beijing’s 
version means the “One China Principle”—will begin to lose its most 
visible manifestations.  The logic here understandably seems to be 
“don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.” 
This is Beijing’s self-imposed dilemma.  On the one hand, it 
cannot afford to abandon the agreements.  On the other hand, it does 
not wish to cooperate with Tsai Ing-wen’s government unless she 
agrees with China’s political position.  Accordingly, we see a Beijing 
that continues to tolerate effective implementation of certain cross-
strait agreements still deemed to be essential, while trying to limit, 
marginalize, or ignore others.  The following notable examples 
illustrate the situation. 
C. Examples of China’s non-compliance with cross-strait 
agreements 
One of Beijing’s earliest post-Ma efforts to put economic 
pressure on Taiwan was its reduction of the number of Mainland 
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Chinese tourists allowed to visit the island.97  The 2008 Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Mainland Tourists Traveling to Taiwan (the Tourism 
Agreement)98 allowed Mainland Chinese tourists to go to Taiwan for 
the first time.  The number of Chinese visitors per year increased 
rapidly from more than 300,000 in 2008 to more than four million in 
2015.99 
The year of Tsai’s ascendancy, 2016, began to see the first 
decline, and in 2017 Taiwan hosted only around 2.7 million Chinese 
tourists.100  Thus, the influx of Chinese tourists has not stopped but 
has dropped quickly.  Beijing has not torn up the Tourism Agreement 
but has reportedly used tactics to discourage or disapprove tourists 
from visiting Taiwan in order to cut the island’s tourism profits.  Yet, 
the initial decrease of tourists from China was offset largely due to 
the increase in number of tourists to Taiwan from South East Asia, 
Japan, Macao, Hong Kong and South Korea.101 
Beijing has also made some cross-strait institutions suspend 
their operation, even affecting one of the most important agreements, 
the ECFA, a major economic agreement that cuts tariffs on more than 
500 Taiwanese exports to China and more than 250 Chinese exports 
to Taiwan.102  Under the ECFA, the two parties jointly established the 
“Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee,” which according 
to the agreement is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the 
agreement, settling any dispute over its interpretation, and 
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negotiating and implementing new agreements related to ECFA.103  
The Committee used to meet regularly, but it has not held any 
meetings since 2015. 104   As a result, when tariff-free treatments 
expire, there is no channel to make new arrangements, and the 
relevant industries (especially Taiwanese industries that had 
benefited from ECFA) are now adversely impacted.105 
Beijing has also suspended the operation of other dispute 
resolution procedures authorized by certain agreements.  In January 
2018, for example, despite Taiwan’s protests, China launched new 
northbound air flights on the M503 route, which is only kilometers 
away from the middle line of the Taiwan Strait and close to a buffer 
zone designed to protect Taiwan against Chinese military 
intrusions.106  China also expanded other routes that are close to 
Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone.107  Taiwan claimed these 
routes to be a great danger to the island’s aviation safety.108  In fact, 
this is not the first time Beijing and Taipei have had aviation disputes.  
In March 2015, the two encountered similar issues over the M503 
route but were able to reach a compromise in accordance with the 
communication clause in the 2009 Supplementary Agreement on 
Cross-Strait Air Transportation. 109   This time, however, Beijing 
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refused to communicate with Taipei under the agreement, claiming 
that its new move did not concern Taiwan.110  In response, Taipei 
canceled 176 charter flights across the Strait ahead of the 2018 Lunar 
New Year.111 
China has also pressed hard to change the existing practice 
under some of the other agreements.  It has, since April 2016, 
persuaded several countries that do not have official diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan (including Kenya, Malaysia, Cambodia and 
Armenia) to send Taiwanese nationals they have detained for 
telecommunications fraud to China rather than Taiwan for 
prosecution.112  This is a sharp departure from China’s practice since 
2011 of collaborating with Taiwanese law enforcement under the 
Judicial Assistance Agreement.  During the 2011-16 period, in 
accordance with the JAA, Chinese police worked jointly with 
Taiwanese police in third countries, not only exchanging information 
but also helping local law enforcement arrest Chinese and Taiwanese 
suspected of colluding in telecom fraud schemes that prey on both 
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. 113   In a friendly exercise of 
discretion, during that period, Chinese police joined in sending 
Taiwanese suspects in third countries directly to Taiwan while 
returning the PRC nationals to Mainland China, thus avoiding any 
political controversy.114 
To be sure, China has always claimed criminal jurisdiction 
over such Taiwanese suspects whenever the alleged fraud has 
victimized PRC citizens.  By now resuming the exercise of that 
jurisdiction, Beijing can punish Taiwanese offenders more severely 
than they have generally been punished if returned to Taiwan.  
Moreover, the cooperation of third countries in deporting Taiwanese 
to the Mainland reminds the world of Beijing’s long-standing 
position that Taiwan is part of China, which is considered helpful at 
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a time when Beijing is building pressure on Tsai’s government to 
adopt the same position.115 
An extreme example of China’s current tactics of simply 
ignoring certain cross-strait agreements is the infamous prosecution 
of Mr. Lee Ming-che, a Taiwanese NGO activist currently serving a 
five-year sentence in China for “subverting state power” by his 
peaceful criticism of the Chinese government.116  Lee disappeared in 
China on March 19, 2017.  Ten days later, Beijing, having ignored 
the Taiwan government’s appeals for information through prescribed 
channels under the Judicial Assistance Agreement, finally 
admitted—without following the prescribed procedures under the 
JAA—that Lee had been placed in official custody.117  Lee’s eventual 
trial was webcast, so that he could be seen confessing to participating 
in a “criminal organization” that allegedly incited web users to spread 
articles that “vilified and defamed China’s socialist system.”118  He is 
the first Taiwanese to be convicted of human rights activity in 
China.119 
During this high-profile case that added much tension to the 
already strained cross-strait relations, Beijing showed no regard for 
the JAA.  Its belated acknowledgement of Lee’s detention—not in 
response to SEF’s requests, but at a routine press conference—was 
itself a violation of the Agreement, which obligates each party to 
“promptly” notify the other side when it has restricted the liberty of 
one of the other side’s people.120  Notification in this case was not 
“prompt,” nor was it communicated through formal channels. 
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Beijing also violated the JAA provision that requires the 
facilitation of family visits to the detainee121; it revoked the entry 
permit of Lee Ming-che’s wife, Ms. Lee Ching-yu, right before she 
boarded a plane from Taiwan to China.122  Throughout this case, the 
Chinese government did not mention a word about its obligations 
under the JAA.  Ms. Lee, after making numerous requests to the 
Chinese government to visit Mr. Lee in prison, finally was allowed 
to do so in March 2018.  More recently, however, her request to see 
her husband was again denied.123  Mr. Lee is now serving a five-year 
sentence for his peaceful rights advocacy, a violation by China of the 
freedom of speech guaranteed under international law and the PRC 
Constitution. 
These major incidents illustrate how Beijing seeks to exert 
pressures on Tsai’s government by non-cooperation, non-compliance 
measures, despite the commitments it has made under the cross-strait 
agreements.  Beijing has not disclaimed the agreements altogether, 
but has adopted a minimalist, selective approach towards their 
implementation. 
D. Beijing’s carrots and sticks 
While Beijing has severed communication with Tsai Ing-
wen’s government, it seeks to appeal to multiple groups of Taiwanese 
through attractive measures that mostly offer economic, educational 
and employment benefits.  The Chinese government now emphasizes 
“integration and development” 124  as a main policy to promote 
economic and social integration with the island.  It also creates new 
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mechanisms, such as a new service center in China for Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macau businesses (run by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade), that enable direct interaction with 
Taiwan business and civic groups, thereby marginalizing the role of 
the DPP government.125 
In fact, after the 2014 Sunflower Movement that frustrated 
Taiwan’s formal legislative approval of the CSSTA, Beijing learned 
that it needed to change its policy to one that would cultivate and lure 
groups of Taiwanese that it had previously overlooked, especially 
those that were deemed to disapprove of economic ties with China.  
Beijing referred to these groups as Sanzhongyiqing (三中一青 ), 
meaning small and medium businesses, people with middle or low 
income, people in Central and Southern Taiwan and young 
generations. 126   The idea is to offer economic benefits to these 
targeted populations so there will be a broader support base in Taiwan 
for unification with China.  This Sanzhongyiqing policy has now been 
more politely rephrased as Yidaiyixian (一代一線 ) to broadly 
include young generations and grassroots communities. 
Most recently, China released a package of “31 measures” 
that are said to give Taiwanese companies and residents “equal 
status” to Mainland Chinese counterparts, showering them with 
business, social and employment opportunities in China.127  These 
include, for example, allowing Taiwanese companies doing business 
on the Mainland to bid for China’s infrastructure projects and to claim 
tax benefits and permitting Taiwanese professionals to take exams for 
a range of 134 professional qualifications.128  Taiwanese students in 
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China are also encouraged to find jobs in China after graduation, 
including, for instance, internships at state-owned banks.129 
The Taiwan government criticizes China’s policy as using 
money to buy political influence, and says it will heighten the 
awareness of the island’s youth about the risks of living under 
China’s undemocratic rule.130  It has also underlined the difference 
between China and Taiwan in values, emphasizing that only with a 
China that fulfills universal values of democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights can peaceful cross-strait relations be achieved.131 
China has always adopted a “mercantilist” approach towards 
Taiwan, especially during the Ma era when the two sides made deals 
that were plainly designed to “offer economic benefits to Taiwan” 
(Rangli 讓利).  Beijing is now intensifying this approach and trying 
to reach broader groups while circumventing official Taipei channels. 
In addition to these economic “carrots,” Beijing also resorts 
to military “sticks” to reinforce the message about its power in 
relation to Taiwan.  The newly-reconstituted Chinese aircraft carrier, 
Liaoning, has sailed through the Taiwan Strait a number of times in 
recent months.132  While Beijing claims these passages are routine 
drills and the carrier has stayed on the west side of the median line of 
the Taiwan Strait,133 it is obvious that Beijing’s move is an intentional 
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effort to intimidate the island’s population.  Alarmed by this new 
tactic, Taipei dispatched fighter jets and ships to monitor these 
crossings carefully.134  In March 2018, days after President Donald 
Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages high-level 
official visits between Taiwan and the U.S., the Liaoning cruised 
through the Taiwan Strait again.135 
Another recent move that heightens Taipei’s unease is 
Beijing’s new northbound flights on the route M503, as noted earlier.  
Taiwan claims that China’s new flights are intended as military and 
political provocations of the island.136  This will require the Taiwan 
government to incur greater military costs to enhance its monitoring 
of the flights.  There are recently even more provocative actions by 
Beijing to increase military tensions and opportunities for 
confrontations.  The most dangerous have been China’s “live-fire” 
naval exercises near the island, which immediately elicited Taipei’s 
own ”live-fire” exercises in response.137 
E. Beijing’s recent international tactics 
At least as early as 2003, Beijing began to designate its long-
standing demand for the return of Taiwan to the Motherland as one 
of its “core interests,” 138  signifying an uncompromising, “non-
negotiable” stance.139  During Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency from 2008 
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to 2016, Beijing relaxed some measures that had been used to block 
Taiwan’s international participation.140 
Since Tsai Ing-wen’s presidential election, Beijing has 
resumed a tougher position.141  Its diplomatic tactics have recently 
included establishing diplomatic ties with Gambia, luring São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso and El 
Salvador to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China,142 
and excluding Taiwan from meetings of the World Health 
Assembly,143 the International Civil Aviation Organization,144 and 
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). 145  
Beijing’s tactics include some that are as pathetic as preventing 
ordinary Taiwanese from even visiting the UN as tourists, unless they 
show a Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents issued by the 
PRC government, which implies Chinese nationality.146 
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These past few years have also seen Beijing escalating tactics 
to put pressures on various international businesses to agree to 
China’s position that Taiwan is part of China.  Beijing has pushed the 
U.S. hotel chain Marriott to apologize for listing Taiwan as a country 
on its website.147  Under China’s pressures, major German companies 
such as Lufthansa, Mercedes-Benz and Bosch have also listed 
Taiwan as part of China on their websites.148  In May 2018, Beijing 
issued an order to dozens of foreign air carriers, demanding that they 
stop referring to Taiwan as an independent nation on their “websites 
or in other material” and that they rename it as “Taiwan, China” or 
“Chinese Taipei.”149  Airlines that fail to comply will suffer sanctions 
and be deemed “untrustworthy” in “China’s social credit system”, 
which will undoubtedly have an adverse impact on their business.150  
All airlines on the list have followed China’s instructions, including 
the U.S. airlines.151  The White House has criticized China’s order as 
“Orwellian nonsense”.152  A U.K. foreign affairs official remarked 
that, “U.K. companies should not be placed under political pressure 
to make changes on its designation of Taiwan.”153 
China’s increasingly assertive behavior on the international 
stage—not just on the question of Taiwan but more generally on other 
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controversial issues, such as the PRC’s military land reclamation 
efforts in the South China Sea and its “united front” attempts to 
influence developments in various democracies, including the EU, 
Australia and New Zealand—has heightened the concerns of many 
countries.154 
The U.S. is particularly alarmed.  Facing a China that is 
widely perceived to be ever more aggressive, as previously 
mentioned, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act in March 
2018.155  On a voice vote, the Act won the unanimous support of both 
Republicans and Democrats in the Senate as well as the House of 
Representatives, which is unusual in America’s current polarized 
political climate.  The Act, which President Trump gladly signed, 
encourages “officials at all levels of the U.S. Government, including 
Cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and other 
executive branch officials,” to travel to Taiwan and high-level 
officials of Taiwan to enter the U.S.156  While the Act is generally 
considered symbolic, it is still a remarkable achievement for 
Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts. 
Beijing, of course, was vexed by this development, since until 
recently it had generally succeeded in preventing high level official 
contacts between Washington and Taipei.  When the U.S. Congress 
was debating the draft Taiwan Travel Act, China’s official media 
issued a warning, threatening serious retaliatory action if the Act 
was adopted.157  Days after passage of the Act, Xi Jinping responded 
with a harsh statement that “[a]ny actions and tricks to split China are 
doomed to failure and will meet with the people’s condemnation and 
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punishment of history.”158  Following the Act’s promulgation, U.S. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Alex Wong, traveled to Taiwan.  
Wong remarked during the visit that “Taiwan can no longer be 
excluded unjustly from international fora.”159  Since President Trump 
later shed doubt upon the wisdom of Wong’s visit,160 however, the 
extent to which Washington intends to implement the Act is unclear. 
In this uncertain but largely negative political climate, in the 
eyes of many in the world community Xi Jinping’s hope to achieve 
the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation by reunifying Taiwan 
with Mainland China is likely to be seen as unduly nationalist and 
expansionist.  How much harder Beijing may push and how much of 
a backlash that might inspire, remains to be seen. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In principle, China views the reunification of Taiwan with the 
Mainland as the most important issue on its agenda.  Yet, Taiwan’s 
continuous growth as one of Asia’s most robust liberal democracies 
as well as its developing Taiwanese national identity are enlarging 
the political and psychological gaps between Taiwan and China.  As 
the former tension across the strait is renewing, this Article seeks to 
contribute to relevant scholarship and policy discussion by offering a 
critical evaluation of the most contentious aspects of current China-
Taiwan relations—the controversial “1992 Consensus” and the 
remarkable cross-strait agreements that Taipei and Beijing have 
concluded. 
We note that the “1992 Consensus” would not be deemed to 
be legally binding under international law; nor was it even a genuine 
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consensus.  The term has been employed by the KMT and CCP as a 
placeholder phrase to refer to their differing positions about China.  
The KMT has used the “1992 Consensus” to refer to the formula of 
OCRI while the CCP has used it to refer to Beijing’s “One China 
Principle.”  That is, the two sides differ on not only what “One China” 
means but also what the “1992 Consensus” means.  The term must be 
understood simply as a formula strategically constructed after the fact 
to allow the KMT and the CCP governments to shelve their differing 
positions concerning which government is the legitimate, exclusive 
representative of “China” and to proceed to cooperation.  It is not 
analogous to an international agreement and should not be considered 
to have binding legal effect on Taipei or Beijing. 
With regard to cross-strait agreements, by contrast, while 
neither Beijing nor Taipei considers them to be “international 
agreements” per se, they would be deemed to be legally binding in 
the eyes of the international legal order, and therefore both China and 
Taipei should be obliged to comply with them in good faith.  
However, their dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms are 
understandably weak and not capable of dealing with the 
unanticipated issue of whether President Tsai’s refusal to endorse the 
“1992 Consensus” entitles Beijing to cease or diminish 
implementation of any of the agreements. 
In these circumstances, we believe that the ROC should try 
once again to negotiate with the PRC through their proxies in 
accordance with the dispute resolution provisions of each of the 
agreements that has gone into effect.  If this renewed effort proves 
fruitless, the ROC should seek to obtain PRC consent to third party 
conciliation or mediation and, if need be, an ad hoc arbitration.  
Although, at present, the chances are nil that the PRC might accept 
any formal third-party role in settling this dispute, the ROC’s effort 
to invoke international third-party participation as well as relevant 
international norms for evaluating the merits of the dispute should 
boost foreign respect for the ROC for prompting the PRC to comply 
with the norms and institutions of the rule-based world order. 
Publicly emphasizing the PRC’s non-compliance with the 
agreements may not only embarrass Beijing and elevate Taipei’s 
status in the court of world opinion, but also stimulate Beijing’s 
willingness to resume negotiations.  If the two parties decide to 
resume negotiations, Taipei, in raising its concerns about Beijing’s 
non-compliance, should seek to include in future agreements, as well 
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as in the amendment of existing ones, more robust procedures for 
resolving disputes, including the possibility of submitting any legal 
issues to an independent tribunal. 
This Article highlights Beijing’s self-imposed dilemma.  In 
Beijing’s view, these cross-strait agreements are difficult to abandon 
and yet equally difficult to fully implement as long as the DPP 
administration does not recognize the “1992 Consensus.”  
Accordingly, Beijing has thus far adopted a highly selective, 
politically expedient approach toward the continuing fulfillment of 
its legal commitments, while making other moves —’carrots and 
sticks’—that bypass and increase pressures upon the DPP 
government.  It is ironic that Beijing insists on Taipei’s literal 
acceptance of the “1992 Consensus”, as though it were a legally 
binding agreement.  Yet, it shows little regard for cross-strait 
agreements that should plainly be deemed legally binding!  As the 
Chinese slogan puts it, “Politics takes command.” 
In our view, political actors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
have generally undervalued the potential of a rule-based order to 
facilitate institutional cooperation and sustainable peace in cross-
strait relations.  The CCP is willing to thumb its nose at cross-strait 
agreements for short-term political gains.  The KMT, zealous to make 
progress in cross-strait relations, tried to ram cross-strait agreements 
through the legislature, underestimating the value of popular scrutiny 
in a democracy and accordingly losing the wide-based support 
required for sustainable cross-strait cooperation.  Even though it now 
dominates Taiwan’s legislature, the DPP, given the current strained 
relations with China, has not begun to seriously promote the draft 
Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act that is required to lay the 
groundwork for Taiwan’s future approval of cross-strait cooperation.  
These short-sighted approaches of the main political actors are likely 
to contribute to a vicious cycle in which law fails to play any 
significant role in restoring cooperation and reducing tension. 
We recognize the realistic challenges of promoting the rule of 
law in cross-strait relations.  Yet Beijing frequently urges other states 
to adopt a long-term perspective, and both Beijing and Taipei have 
continuing incentives to cultivate greater respect for their cross-strait 
agreements in order to facilitate their lasting cooperation.  
Unjustifiable non-compliance with these agreements undermines 
their credibility.  If these agreements can no longer be trusted, Beijing 
will lose a valuable tool to exert its influence, enable cooperation with 
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Taiwan and foster peaceful development in the region.  Also, 
although Beijing does not regard cross-strait agreements to be within 
the ambit of international law, its persistent non-compliance will be 
interpreted by others as further evidence of its disdain for the 
international rules of the game.  This cannot be in Beijing’s long-term 
interest. 
Taiwan, and countries that support its democratic progress, 
should not miss this opportunity to encourage the PRC to respect, and 
make use of, some of the most important and enduring rules and 
institutions of the world community. 
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